Often they are the sole American military presence in a nation, every day making tough decisions in unheard-of situations, with no one looking over their shoulders. They volunteered for this duty because they prefer the challenge of working in an austere, uncertain and unstructured environment.
The Army’s Special Forces, known popularly as the Green Berets, are specially selected and trained. They are America’s main weapon for waging unconventional warfare in an age when conventional conflicts have become increasingly rare.
In the future as in the past, U.S. Special Forces will be called upon to conduct critical missions in the face of overwhelming odds. It is a task they can look forward to with confidence because the tradition of Army Special Forces is one of excellence. It is because of this record that the modern-day Special Forces remain devoted to their Latin motto, De Oppresso Liber – To Free the Oppressed. [headline h=”4″]The Origin of Special Forces[/headline] The Army’s premier proponent of unconventional warfare, SF traces its historical roots from the elite Army formations of World War II and the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS. The OSS was formed in World War II to gather strategic intelligence and conduct operations behind enemy lines in support of resistance groups in Europe and the Far East. After the war, individuals such as Colonel Aaron Bank, a former OSS operative, and Colonel Wendell Fertig and Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann, both of whom fought as guerrillas in the Philippines, used their wartime experience to formulate the doctrine of unconventional warfare that became the cornerstone of SF. In the Army’s official lineage and honors, the SF groups are linked to the regiments of the First Special Service Force, an elite combined Canadian-American unit that fought in the Aleutians, Italy and southern France. [headline h=”4″]Special Operations Units of World War II[/headline] The First Special Service Force, nicknamed the Devil’s Brigade, was a joint Canadian-American unit formed on July 9, 1942, at Fort William Henry Harrison, Mont. Airborne-qualified and intensively trained in mountaineering, skiing and amphibious operations, the First Special Service Force saw action in the Aleutians; in Italy, where the soldiers scaled the heights of Monte Le Defensa to break the German winter line; at Anzio; and as the amphibious spearhead for the invasion of southern France. The force was inactivated in December 1944 near Menton, France. Menton Day is still observed by the SF groups in honor of this elite infantry formation. The Force adopted the crossed arrows of the U.S. Army’s Indian Scouts, which later became the branch insignia of Special Forces.
The Army Rangers of World War II began with the activation of the 1st Ranger Battalion on June 19, 1942, in Carrickfergus, Ireland. The 1st Battalion was nicknamed Darby’s Rangers for their commander, Colonel William O. Darby. Six Ranger battalions were created during World War II. The 1st through 5th Ranger battalions fought in North Africa, Italy and other parts of Europe. Unaffiliated with these battalions was the 6th Ranger Battalion, which fought in the Southwest Pacific Theater. The 6th Ranger Battalion was created in December 1943 at the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, who saw the need for a Ranger force to replicate the Marine Raider battalions in the Pacific Theater. The Ranger battalions were disbanded at the end of World War II.
Merrill’s Marauders was the title given to Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill’s, 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), a 3,000-man long-range penetration force modeled on the British “Chindits.” The Marauders fought in five major battles and 17 skirmishes in the China-Burma-India Theater. The Marauders’ greatest feat was their march through miles of thick Burmese jungle en route to the capture of the vital airfield at Myitkyina. Decimated by disease and battle casualties, the Marauders were disbanded after the battle and replaced by the Mars Task Force, a similar infantry formation that fought in Burma and China until the end of the war. While with the Mars Task Force, First Sergeant Jack Knight earned the only Medal of Honor awarded to a special-operations Soldier during World War II. In the Southwest Pacific Theater, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, the innovative commander of the Sixth Army, established an elite reconnaissance unit called the Alamo Scouts. The Scouts ran more than 80 reconnaissance missions in New Guinea and the Philippines, providing accurate, timely intelligence for the Sixth Army. In perhaps their greatest feat, the Scouts led a company of the 6th Ranger Battalion and Filipino guerrillas in an attack on the Japanese prison camp at Cabanatuan, 30 miles behind the Japanese lines, freeing all 513 Allied prisoners. Never numbering more than 70 volunteers, the Alamo Scouts earned 44 Silver Star Medals, 33 Bronze Star Medals and four Soldier’s Medals by the end of the war. In more than 80 hazardous missions, they never lost a man in action. Command Sergeant Major Galen Kittleson, a Son Tay raider, began his career with the Alamo Scouts.
Lieutenant General Krueger also formed the 6th Ranger Battalion to provide his Army with the capability of conducting raids behind enemy lines. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci, the battalion commander, led the raid on Cabanatuan. Captain Arthur “Bull” Simons, a key figure in the early days of Special Forces, served as a company commander with the 6th Ranger Battalion.
Besides these organized special-operations efforts, a number of U.S. Army officers chose not to surrender at Bataan and conducted guerrilla operations behind Japanese lines in the Philippines. Major Russell Volckmann, who later played an important role in the birth of Special Forces, escaped from the enemy and with First Lieutenant Donald D. Blackburn, formed a Filipino guerrilla band in northern Luzon, which by 1945 consisted of five regiments. Colonel Wendell Fertig raised his own guerrilla force on Mindanao that ultimately totaled some 20,000 fighters. These men organized the insurgency against the Japanese and waged a classic guerrilla campaign until the end of the war. [headline h=”4″]Shadow Warriors: The OSS[/headline] The Office of Strategic Services was the product of Major General William O. Donovan, an energetic visionary whose propensity for freewheeling activity earned him the nickname “Wild Bill.” Donovan was a tough and smart veteran of World War I who received the Medal of Honor for heroism on the Western Front in October 1918, and who made a fortune as a Wall Street lawyer during the 1920s and ’30s. When World War II erupted in Europe and threatened to engulf the United States, Donovan convinced President Franklin D. Roosevelt that a new type of organization was needed, one that would collect intelligence and wage secret operations behind enemy lines.
In 1941, President Roosevelt directed Donovan to form this agency, called the Coordinator of Information, or COI, and Donovan, who had been a civilian since World War I, was reinstated as a colonel. COI blossomed quickly, establishing operational sites in England, North Africa, India, Burma and China. In 1942, the agency was renamed the OSS. Donovan became a major general in 1944. The primary combat operations of the OSS in Europe were those of the Jedburgh’s missions and the Operational Groups. The Jedburgh mission consisted of parachuting three-man multinational teams into France, Belgium and Holland, where they trained partisan resistance movements and conducted guerrilla operations against the Germans. The OGs were 34-man elements designed to operate in two sections and perform sabotage missions and raids behind enemy lines. Other OSS operations took place in Asia, most spectacularly in Burma, where OSS Detachment 101 organized 11,000 Kachin tribesmen into a force that eventually killed 10,000 Japanese with a minimal loss of its own. Other OSS detachments operated in China and Southeast Asia. Soldiers John K. Singlaub, Caesar Civitella and Herbert Brucker were among the many former OSS members who later served in Special Forces. After the war, President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS, but not before creating a legacy still felt today. Many veterans of OSS were part of the cadre of the early SF groups.
OSS operative Colonel Aaron Bank and Colonel Russell Volckmann, the Philippine guerrilla leader, remained in the military after the war. They worked tirelessly to convince the Army to adopt its own unconventional, guerrilla-style force. They had an ally in Brigadier General Robert McClure, who headed the Army’s psychological-warfare staff in the Pentagon. McClure convinced the Army that there were areas in the world not susceptible to conventional warfare -Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe especially – but that would make ideal targets for unconventional harassment and guerrilla fighting. Special operations, as envisioned by these men, was a force multiplier: a small number of soldiers who could sow a disproportionately large amount of trouble for the enemy. It was a bold idea, one that went against the grain of traditional concepts, but by 1952 the Army was finally ready to embark on a new era of unconventional warfare. [headline h=”4″]Special Forces: The Early Years[/headline] Special Forces grew out of the establishment of the Special Operations Division of the Psychological Warfare Center, activated at Fort Bragg, N.C., in May 1952. The Army allocated 2,300 personnel slots to be used to stand up the first SF unit when the Ranger companies fighting in the Korean War were disbanded. The 10th SF Group was established with Colonel Aaron Bank as the first commander. Concurrent with this was the establishment of the Psychological Warfare School, which ultimately became today’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.
Bank assembled a cadre of officers and NCOs to serve as the foundation of the new unit and act as a training staff for the fledgling organization. Bank didn’t want raw recruits. He wanted the best troops in the Army, and he got them: former OSS officers, airborne troops, ex-Rangers and combat veterans of World War II and Korea. After months of preparation, the 10th SF Group was activated on June 11, 1952, at Fort Bragg. On the day of its activation, the total strength of the group was 10 Soldiers – Bank, one warrant officer and eight enlisted men. Within months, the first volunteers reported to the 10th SF Group by the hundreds as they completed the initial phase of their SF training. As soon as the 10th Group became large enough, Bank began training his troops in the most advanced techniques of unconventional warfare. As defined by the Army, the main mission of the 10th SF Group was “to infiltrate by land, sea or air, deep into enemy-occupied territory and organize the resistance/guerrilla potential to conduct Special Forces operations, with emphasis on guerrilla warfare.” As Bank put it, “Our training included many more complex subjects and was geared to entirely different, more difficult, comprehensive missions and complex operations.”
After less than a year and a half as a full SF group, Bank’s men proved to the Army’s satisfaction that they had mastered the skills of their new trade. On Nov. 11 1953, half of the 10th SF Group was deployed to Bad Tolz, West Germany. The other half remained at Fort Bragg, where it was redesignated as the 77th SF Group. The split of the 10th and the 77th was the first sign that SF had established itself as an integral part of the Army’s basic structure. For the rest of the 1950s, SF would grow slowly but consistently. By the end of 1952, the first SF troops to operate behind enemy lines had been deployed to Korea on missions that remained classified for nearly 30 years. Anti-communist guerrillas with homes in North Korea and historical ties to Seoul had joined the United Nations Partisan Forces-Korea. Known as “Donkeys” and “Wolfpacks,” the guerrilla units and their American cadre operated from tiny islands off the North Korean coast. The partisans conducted raids on the mainland and rescued downed airmen. Under the guidance of a select group from the 10th SF Group and other U.S. cadre, they eventually numbered 22,000 and claimed 69,000 enemy casualties. On April 1, 1956, the 14th Special Forces Operational Detachment with select members from 77th SF Group, 12th, 13th and 16th operational detachments, under the cover unit of the 8251st Army Service Unit, transferred to Fort Shaffer, Hawaii from Fort Bragg, N.C., in June 1956. Shortly afterward, the 12th, 13th and 16th SFOD (Regiment) were moved to Camp Drake, Japan under the cover unit identification of 8231st Army Unit. 1st Special Forces Group was officially activated on June 24, 1957 at Camp Drake, however, the activation ceremony was held on July 14, 1957 at Camp Buckner, Okinawa. On Oct. 30, 1960, all SF groups were reorganized under the combat arms regimental system. 1st SF Group was regimented 1st SF Group in recognition of its lineage with the First Special Service Force of World War II.
By 1958, the basic operational unit of SF had evolved into a 12-man team known as the SF ODA. Each member of the team – two officers, two operations and intelligence sergeants, two weapons sergeants, two communications sergeants, two medics and two engineers – were trained in unconventional warfare, were cross-trained in each others’ specialties, and spoke at least one foreign language. This composition allowed each detachment to operate if necessary in two six-man teams, or split-A teams.
By the time John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as president in January 1961, the three SF groups – the 10th, the 7th (redesignated from the 77th on June 6, 1960) and the 1st – were actively engaged in missions around the world. Under the patronage of President Kennedy, SF flourished. In 1961, President Kennedy visited Fort Bragg. He inspected the 82nd Airborne Division and other conventional troops of the XVIII Airborne Corps. As a student of military affairs, President Kennedy had developed an interest in counterinsurgency – the art and method of defeating guerrilla movements. As he gazed at the ranks of SF troops, he realized he had the ideal vehicle for carrying out such missions. With President Kennedy firmly behind them, new SF groups sprang up rapidly. On Sept. 21,1961, the 5th Group was activated, followed in 1963 by the 8th Group on April 1, the 6th on May 1, and the 3rd on Dec. 5. In April 1966, the 46th SF Company was activated at Fort Bragg. Formerly Company D, 1st SF Group, 46th Company deployed to Thailand to train the Royal Thai Army until November 1967.
President Kennedy’s interest in SF resulted in the adoption of the Green Beret as the official headgear of all SF troops. Until then, the beret had faced an uphill fight in its struggle to achieve official Army recognition. After his visit to Fort Bragg, the president told the Pentagon that he considered the Green Beret to be “symbolic of one of the highest levels of courage and achievement of the United States military.” Soon, the Green Beret became synonymous with SF. [headline h=”4″]The Story Behind the Green Beret[/headline] The Green Beret was originally designed in 1953 by SF Major Herbert Brucker, a veteran of the OSS. Later that year, First Lieutenant Roger Pezelle adopted it as the unofficial headgear for his A-team, Operational Detachment FA32. They wore it whenever they went to the field for prolonged exercises. Soon it spread throughout all of SF, although the Army refused to authorize its official use. Finally, in 1961, President John F. Kennedy planned to visit Fort Bragg. He sent word to the Special Warfare Center commander, Brigadier General William P. Yarborough, for all SF Soldiers to wear their berets for the event. President Kennedy felt that since they had a special mission, SF should have something to set them apart from the rest. Even before the presidential request, however, the Department of the Army had acquiesced and teletyped a message to the center authorizing the beret as a part of the SF uniform.
When President Kennedy came to Fort Bragg Oct. 12, 1961, General Yarborough wore his Green Beret to greet the commander-in-chief. The president remarked, “Those are nice. How do you like the Green Beret?” General Yarborough replied, “They’re fine, Sir. We’ve wanted them a long time.”
A message from President Kennedy to General Yarborough later that day stated, “My congratulations to you personally for your part in the presentation today … The challenge of this old but new form of operations is a real one, and I know that you and the members of your command will carry on for us and the free world in a manner which is both worthy and inspiring. I am sure that the Green Beret will be a mark of distinction in the trying times ahead.”
In an April 1962 White House memorandum for the U.S. Army, President Kennedy showed his continued support for SF, calling the Green Beret “a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom.” [headline h=”4″]Special Forces During the Vietnam Era[/headline] Nam Dong, Lang Vei, Dak To, A Shau, Plei Mei – these were just some of the places SF troops fought and died during their 15-year stay in South Vietnam. It was a stay that began in June 1957, when the original 16 members of the 14th SF Operational Detachment deployed to Vietnam to train a cadre of indigenous Vietnamese SF teams. The first and last American Soldiers to die in Vietnam due to enemy action were members of the 1st SF Group. On Oct. 21, 1957, Captain Harry G. Cramer Jr. was killed, and on Oct. 12, 1972, Sgt. Fred C. Mick was killed.
Throughout the latter years of the 1950s and early 1960s, the number of Special Forces advisers in Vietnam steadily increased. Their responsibility was to train South Vietnamese soldiers in the art of counterinsurgency and to mold various native tribes into a credible anti-communist threat. Initially, elements from the different SF groups were involved in advising the South Vietnamese. In September 1964, the 5th SF Group was formed exclusively to conduct operations in Vietnam. The 5th Group set up its provisional headquarters in Nha Trang. Nearly six months later, in February, Nha Trang became the 5th’s permanent headquarters. From that point on, all SF Soldiers in Vietnam were assigned to the 5th until 1971, when the group returned to Fort Bragg.
By the time the 5th left Southeast Asia, SF soldiers had earned 17 Medals of Honor, one Distinguished Service Medal, 90 Distinguished Service Crosses, 814 Silver Star Medals, 13,234 Bronze Star Medals, 235 Legions of Merit, 46 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 232 Soldier’s Medals, 4,891 Air Medals, 6,908 Army Commendation Medals and 2,658 Purple Hearts. It was a brilliant record, built on blood and sacrifice.
Not to be overlooked, other SF training teams were operating in the 1960s in Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia and the Dominican Republic. Counterinsurgency forces of the 8th SF Group conducted clandestine operations against guerrilla forces, carrying out some 450 missions between 1965 and 1968. In 1968, SF-trained Bolivian rangers were involved in tracking down and capturing the notorious revolutionary, Che Guevara, in the wilds of south-central Bolivia.
Southeast Asia, however, was the SF’s primary focus. Through their unstinting labors, SF troops eventually established 254 outposts throughout Vietnam, many of them defended by a single A-team and hundreds of friendly natives.
But fighting in remote areas of Vietnam – publicity to the contrary – wasn’t the only mission of SF. It was also responsible for training thousands of Vietnam’s ethnic tribesmen in the techniques of guerrilla warfare. SF took the Montagnards, the Nungs, the Cao Dei and others and molded them into the 60,000-strong Civilian Irregular Defense Group, or CIDG. CIDG troops became the SF’s most valuable ally in battles fought in faraway corners of Vietnam, out of reach of conventional back-up forces. Other missions included civic-action projects, in which SF troops built schools, hospitals and government buildings, provided medical care to civilians and dredged canals. This was the other side of the SF mission, the part of the war designed to win the hearts and minds of the people.
SF personnel were instrumental in the covert war against North Vietnam. The Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group, or MACV-SOG, conducted cross-border operations into Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam to disrupt the enemy’s use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. SF-led teams ran in-country long-range reconnaissance patrols under the Delta, Sigma and Omega projects. In one of the most daring missions of the war, 100 Special Forces Soldiers under Colonel “Bull” Simons launched a raid to rescue 70 American prisoners of war from the Son Tay Prison outside Hanoi. Staged out of Thailand, the assault was successful, but unbeknownst to the U.S., the prisoners had been relocated due to the flooding of a nearby river. The valiant attempt, known as Operation Ivory Coast, raised the morale of the POWs and forced the North Vietnamese into improving the treatment of the captives. On March 5, 1971, the 5th Group returned to Fort Bragg, although some SF teams remained in Thailand, from where they launched secret missions into Vietnam. But by the end of 1972, the SF role in Vietnam was over. [headline h=”4″]The Son Tay Raid[/headline] By the spring of 1970, more than 350 U.S. pilots had been downed in North Vietnam and were being held prisoner. Exposed to horrid conditions and frequent torture, most American prisoners of war were never allowed to contact the outside world. In May 1970, reconnaissance photographs revealed the existence of two prison camps west of Hanoi. At Son Tay, one photograph identified large “K” – a code for “come get us” – drawn in the dirt.
Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn, who had trained Filipino guerrillas in World War II, suggested that a small group of SF volunteers rescue the prisoners of war. He chose Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. “Bull” Simons to lead the group. Because the compound was more than 20 miles west of Hanoi, planners of the operation believed that Son Tay was isolated enough to enable a small group to land, release prisoners and withdraw. A full-scale replica of the compound was constructed at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., where a select group of SF Soldiers trained at night. The mock compound was dismantled during the day to elude detection by Soviet satellites. Despite security measures, time was running out. Evidence, although inconclusive, showed that perhaps Son Tay was being emptied.
On Nov. 18, 1970, the Son Tay raiders moved to Takhli, Thailand. Only Simons and three others knew what the mission was to be. Five hours before takeoff Nov. 20, Simons told his 59 men: “We are going to rescue 70 American prisoners of war, maybe more, from a camp called Son Tay. This is something American prisoners have a right to expect from their fellow Soldiers. The target is 23 miles west of Hanoi.” As Simons left the room, the Soldiers broke into applause.
The Navy provided diversionary fire as the raid began. The raiders had less than 30 minutes to complete their mission or face North Vietnamese reinforcements. Nine minutes into the raid, Simons was outside the prison walls after his chopper mistakenly touched down at another site. Most of the 60-plus guards at Son Tay were dead or wounded, but a disturbing fact was becoming obvious. There were no prisoners – they had been moved to another camp when a nearby river threatened to flood.
The Son Tay raid ended after 27 minutes. Simons had not lost a single man, and although there were no prisoners to rescue, the operation itself was nearly flawless. [headline h=”4″]Special Forces: Post-Vietnam[/headline] The years immediately following Vietnam were lean ones for SF. The 1st, 3rd, 6th and 8th SF groups were inactivated, and there was a general de-emphasis of special operations as the Army concentrated once more on conventional warfare, turning its gaze from the jungles of Asia to the plains of Central Europe.
To prevent a further reduction of their capabilities, SF leaders adopted a program called SPARTAN – Special Proficiency at Rugged Training and Nation-building. SPARTAN was designed to demonstrate the multiplicity of talents SF troops possessed, showing that they were not outmoded simply because the Vietnam war was over. Under the aegis of SPARTAN, the 5th and 7th groups worked with Indian tribes in Florida, Arizona and Montana to build roads and medical facilities, and they provided free medical treatment to impoverished citizens of Hoke and Anson counties in North Carolina.
However noble SPARTAN was, it was not what SF was designed for. SF existed to train and fight unconventional warfare, and when President Ronald W. Reagan took office in 1981, they got that chance again. During the Reagan presidency, national defense received renewed emphasis. SF in particular was among the beneficiaries of this new attention. The need for SF capabilities had become apparent with the rise of insurgencies as far away as Africa and Asia, and as close to home as Central America. To meet the challenges of a changing world, the Army revitalized SF.
The Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, was made longer and tougher to ensure that the highest-caliber Soldiers joined the ranks of the Green Berets. In June 1983, the Army authorized a uniform tab for wear on the left shoulder by SF troops. The Army established a separate career management field (CMF 18) for SF enlisted men on Oct. 1, 1984. The Special Forces warrant officer career field (180A) soon followed and, on April 9 1987, the Army Chief of Staff established a separate branch for SF officers (18A). Despite the numerous changes after Vietnam, the basic element – the SF ODA – remained largely unchanged. The only detachment position to change was that of the team executive officer, no longer filled by a lieutenant, but by an SF Warrant Officer with several years of detachment experience.
During the 1980s, SF teams were deployed to dozens of countries around the globe. Missions varied from training allied nations to defend themselves to offering humanitarian aid, like medical care and building construction, in remote villages of Third World countries. SF proved particularly successful in El Salvador and Honduras, preventing the civil war in neighboring Nicaragua from spreading beyond its borders. In Colombia, SF teams conducted a long-term program of upgrading the capabilities of the Colombian military in its counterinsurgent fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia insurgency and the drug cartels.
In December 1989, SF was called upon in Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama. Designated Task Force Black, Soldiers from the 7th SF Group, many of whom were already stationed in Panama, supported the entire operation by conducting surveillance and implementing blocking tactics. At H-hour, Task Force Black secured a bridge at the Pacora River, engaged units of the Panama Defense Forces in an intense firefight and, despite being outnumbered, succeeded in preventing PDF reinforcements from reaching U.S. Rangers.
During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91, elements of the 3rd, 5th and 10th SF groups deployed in support of the coalition. The teams performed strategic-reconnaissance missions and supported training for the forces of the allies. From 1992 to 1995, SF teams from the 3rd and 5th groups worked with the UN to re-establish stability in Somalia. This highlighted SF’s first exposure to military operations other than war in a peacekeeping environment. [headline h=”4″]Special Forces in the Modern Era[/headline] As conflict continues to threaten U.S. allies throughout the world, the Defense Department looks to the unique training and experience of the Green Berets. Fort Bragg’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, where prospective SF Soldiers are carefully selected, is training more men than ever for SF qualification and dangerous tasks like free-fall parachuting, escape and evasion, and maritime operations.
The June 1990 reactivation of Fort Bragg’s 3rd SF Group brought to five the number of SF groups on active duty. Other SF groups are the original 10th Group, stationed at Fort Carson, CO, with its 1st Battalion stationed in Stuttgart, Germany; 1st Group at Fort Lewis, WA, with 1st Battalion stationed in Okinawa; 5th Group at Fort Campbell, KY; and 7th Group at Fort Bragg. National Guard units include the 19th and 20th Groups.
In September 1994, U.S. forces were deployed to the Caribbean island of Haiti. The 2nd Battalion, 3rd SF Group’s, mission was to support the Multinational Force-Haiti in establishing and maintaining a stable and secure environment in order to facilitate the transition of the new government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
The signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, commonly known as the Dayton Accords, ended the three-and-a-half year war that ravaged Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it led to another mission for SF. SF in Bosnia participated in Operations Joint Endeavor (December 1995 – December 1996), Joint Guard (December 1996 – June 1998), and Joint Forge (June 1998 – December 2004)]. A combined joint special-operations task force, lead by the 10th SF Group, served as the command and control headquarters for three NATO-controlled division areas. Each division (U.K., U.S. and French) was assigned a special-operations command and control element, or SOCCE, to provide the division commanders with command and control of SOF in their sectors, ensure dedicated and secure communications to SOF elements, coordinate SOF and conventional force operations, and advise the division commanders on SOF capabilities and employment options. Each SOCCE controlled several coalition support teams, or CSTs, to provide their non-NATO counterparts with five capabilities: close air support, medical evacuation, secure communications with higher headquarters and other units (for obvious reasons, NATO was unwilling to simply hand over secure satellite equipment and cryptological codes to non-NATO countries), intelligence connectivity with higher headquarters, and liaison support. While the 10th SF Group took the majority of the mission, ODAs from 1st, 3rd and 7th SF groups served as CSTs during the operation. The CSTs changed their designation to liaison coordination element by the summer of 1996, but little changed with the mission. In December 1996, SF added the joint commission observer, or JCO, mission. JCOs’ primary mission was to serve as the commander’s eyes and ears on the ground and to verify information or intelligence derived from other sources. A typical JCO team of 10 included support and Civil Affairs personnel, and sometimes was augmented with up to 10 Soldiers as a quick-reaction force. USSF provided JCOs in as many as 19 locations in Bosnia.
Between September 1997 and early 1999, the 3rd SF Group trained battalions of the Senegalese Army as part of the African Crisis Response Initiative. SF engagement in Africa reflected the global mission of SF as the U.S. entered the 21st Century. [headline h=”4″]Operation Enduring Freedom[/headline] When the U.S. was attacked on 9/11, SF played a major role in the U.S. response. The U.S. retaliated quickly against the Taliban, which supported the al-Qaeda terrorists who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks and sought protection in Afghanistan, by launching Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF. The 5th SF Group formed a joint special operations task force known as Task Force Dagger to control special operations in northern Afghanistan. Beginning in October 2001, 5th Group operational detachments supported the tribal coalitions know as the Northern Alliance and drove the Taliban out of its strongholds in the north and retook the capitol city of Kabul. By December, the Taliban had been routed from the cities, and the campaign transitioned to hunting the insurgents in the mountain valleys of eastern Afghanistan. The initial campaign ended with the establishment of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) and the formation of a duly elected Afghan government.
Operation Enduring Freedom continued with subsequent rotations from all the SF Groups with the 3rd and 7th Groups forming the core element of the CJSOTF-A. Training and fighting with the Afghan National Army, the Afghan police and security forces and continuing the search for high-value targets were the primary missions of the SF teams. In October 2006, the U.S. led coalition turned over operations in Afghanistan to NATO-ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), with SF groups continuing to form the core of the CJSOTF. Concurrent with OEF was Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, a campaign to provide support to the Philippine government in defeating the Islamic insurgency on the island of Basilan. Operational detachments from the 1st SF Group trained Philippine army units who conducted combat operations against the insurgency and hostage-rescue missions on the island. The establishment of CJSOTF-Philippines continued the rotations of 1st Group teams in support of one of America’s key strategic partners. [headline h=”4″]Operation Iraqi Freedom[/headline] March 19, 2003 signaled the start of the second major campaign in the United States’ war on terror, Operation Iraqi Freedom, or OIF. The U.S. led coalition that invaded Iraq to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein included two SF groups. In the south, the 5th SF Group, in a reprise of Task Force Dagger, had the mission of “Scud-hunting” to prevent the launch of Iraqi missiles against Israel coalition forces and Israel. The ODAs of TF Dagger ranged far and wide in the trackless desert, preventing the deployment of missiles and halting the reinforcement of Saddam’s forces by outside terrorist groups.
In northern Iraq, the 10th SF Group augmented with one Battalion from the 3rd SF Group, operating as Task Force Viking, worked with the Kurdish militias to fix the Iraqi divisions stationed along the political boundary known as the Green Line and prevented their reinforcing Saddam’s army in Baghdad. Executing a classic SF mission, TF Viking trained and supplied the Kurdish forces that subsequently drove the Iraqi army out of the towns of Mosul and Irbil and secured the northern flank of the U.S. coalition. OIF rotations have continued with the 5th and 10th SF groups training the rebuilt Iraqi army and police forces, as well as conducting operations to capture high-value targets. [headline h=”4″]SF and the War on Terror[/headline] Special Forces have been a key element of the U.S. campaign against terrorism worldwide. The SF groups regularly rotate through Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, as well as Africa and South America. In addition these rotations, the traditional support to partner nations in Central and South America, the Far East, and other locations continues as SF units are deployed around the globe.
The demand for SF today has resulted in an increased production from SWCS. A retooling of the selection-and-assessment process and a reorganization of the SFQC now produce more than 700 SF enlisted graduates each year. In addition, a fourth battalion has been authorized for each SF group as the demand for expertise in UW increases. [A special thanks to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School for their assistance in providing this Brief History of Special Forces] [/toggle_content]
The same events and pressures that shaped directly or indirectly the major part of American foreign policy during the last twenty years led to the formation and activation of the U.S. Army Special Forces.
In February of 1950 the United States recognized a quasi-independent Vietnam within the French Union and first began to consider granting aid to the French forces fighting against Communist insurgency in Indochina. In May of the same year the United States agreed to grant military and economic aid. American involvement in post-World War II Southeast Asia had begun. Four years later, in May 1954, the French Army was defeated by the Viet Minh-the Communist-supported Vietnam Independence League- at Dien Bien Phu, and under the Geneva armistice agreement Vietnam was divided into North and South Vietnam. In the course of those four years the policy-makers of the United States had an opportunity to observe the struggle of France with the insurgents and to become familiar with the political and military situation in Vietnam. It was also during those years that the U.S. Army Special Forces came into existence.
The 1st Special Service Force of World War II is considered the antecedent of the present U.S. Army Special Forces. In the spring of 1942 the British Chief of Combined Operations, Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, introduced to U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall a project conceived by an English civilian, Geoffrey N. Pike, for the development of special equipment to be used in snow-covered mountain terrain. This plan, named PLOUGH, was designed for attack on such critical points as the hydroelectric plants in Norway upon which the Germans depended for mining valuable ores. American manufacturers working on equipment for the project developed a tracked vehicle known as the Weasel and eventually standardized as the M29.
General Marshall concluded that an elite force recruited in Canada and the United States would be the best military organization for conducting the raids and strikes; he selected an American, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Tryon Frederick, to assemble, organize, train, and command the U.S.-Canadian 1st Special Service Force.
Made up of three regiments of two battalions each, the unit became a separate branch of the service, with the crossed arrows of the Indian Scouts, by then inactivated, as its insignia. The men were trained in demolitions, rock-climbing, amphibious assault, and ski techniques, and were given basic airborne instruction. They fought under Allied command with great bravery and considerable success in the Aleutians, North Africa, Italy, and southern France. The 1st Special Service Force got its nickname, “The Devil’s Brigade,” during the Italian campaign from a passage in the captured diary of a dead German officer who had written: “The black devils are all around us every time we come into line and we never hear them.” The force was inactivated in southern France near the end of World War II.
On 20 June 1952 the first of the Special Forces groups, the 10th Special Forces Group, was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; it became the nucleus of the Special Warfare Center, now known as the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, at Fort Bragg. The next unit to be formed was the 77th Special Forces Group, which was also activated at Fort Bragg, on 25 September 1953.
By July 1954 the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, numbered 342. In October of that year President Dwight D. Eisenhower promised direct aid to the government of South Vietnam, headed at that time by Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. From 1954 to 1956 Viet Minh cadres were forming action committees to spread propaganda and to organize the South Vietnamese to oppose their own government. In July 1955 the People’s Republic of China announced an agreement to aid the Viet Minh, and the Soviet Union announced aid to Hanoi. In August Diem’s government rejected for the third time Hanoi’s demands for general elections throughout the two Vietnams, and in October South Vietnam was proclaimed a republic by Premier Diem, who became the first president.
U.S. Special Forces troops actually worked in Vietnam for the first time in 1957. On 24 June 1957 the 1st Special Forces Group was activated on Okinawa, and in the course of the year a team from this unit trained fifty-eight men of the Vietnamese Army at the Commando Training Center in Nha Trang. The trainees would later become the nucleus, as instructors and cadre, for the first Vietnamese Special Forces units.
In 1959 and 1960 the insurgents in South Vietnam, known to the South Vietnamese as Viet Cong, a contraction for Vietnamese Communists, grew in number and in power to terrorize the people. Clashes between government forces and armed Viet Cong increased in number from 180 in January 1960 to 545 in September of that year. Thirty Special Forces instructors were sent from Fort Bragg to South Vietnam in May 1960 to set up a training program for the Vietnamese Army. President John F. Kennedy announced on 21 September 1961 a program to provide additional military and economic aid to Vietnam. The government of the United States was by this time deeply concerned over the insurgency in South Vietnam and the necessary steps were being taken to help the republic to deal with it.
On 21 September 1961 the 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces, which would eventually be charged with the conduct of all Special Forces operations in Vietnam, was activated at Fort Bragg. It was at this point, in the fall of 1961, that President Kennedy began to display particular interest in the Special Forces. His enthusiasm, based on his conviction that the Special Forces had great potential as a counterinsurgency force, led him to become a very powerful advocate for the development of the Special Forces program within the Army. President Kennedy himself made a visit to the Special Warfare Center in the fall of 1961 to review the program, and it was by his authorization that Special Forces troops were allowed to wear the distinctive headgear that became the symbol of the Special Forces, the Green Beret.
Up to 1961 the government of South Vietnam and the U.S. Mission in Saigon in dealing with the insurgency had placed primary emphasis on developing the regular military forces, which for the most part excluded the ethnic and religious minority groups. Under the sponsorship of the U.S. Mission in Saigon, however, several programs were initiated in late 1961 to broaden the counterinsurgency effort by developing the paramilitary potential of certain of these minority groups. Special Forces detachments were assigned-to the U.S. Mission in Saigon to provide training and advisory assistance in the conduct of these programs, which eventually came to be known collectively as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program. The development of paramilitary forces among the minority groups became the primary mission of the Special Forces in Vietnam.
Originally attention was concentrated on the Montagnards, who lived in the strategic Central Highlands. The first step was taken in October 1961 with the beginning of a project designed to prevent the Rhade tribesmen in Darlac Province from succumbing to Viet Cong control. Exploratory talks were held with Rhade leaders in Darlac to seek their participation in a village self-defense program. One Special Forces medical noncommissioned officer participated in that first effort. Early in 1962 the government of the United States under President Kennedy began to set up the actual interdepartmental machinery for aiding South Vietnam. The Executive Branch, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the Central Intelligence Agency were all involved. Because of the nature of the growing conflict in Vietnam and because the Special Forces was designed for unconventional warfare, it was inevitable that the Special Forces would play a conspicuous role. It was also plain that the actions and suggestions of the various government agencies would heavily influence that role.[headline h=”4″]The Unconventional Requirements[/headline]
In 1961 a serious examination of the responsibility of the U.S. Army in the cold war had been instituted at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The strategy of “wars of liberation” as practiced by the Communists was analyzed in detail, lessons learned were reviewed, and a comprehensive assessment of U.S. Army capabilities was prepared to show the resources available to the United States for resisting insurgency. Doctrinal gaps were identified, mission statements amended, and training requirements defined.
The initial efforts of the United States to counter subversive insurgency in Vietnam quickly became a co-ordinated departmental endeavor at the highest national level. In addition to mustering the talent, technical ability, and equipment of the military, the government called on each department to nominate certain units and numbers of forces which it considered best prepared to deal with the peculiarities of countering insurgencies. The U.S. Army chose as its vanguard unit the Special Forces, whose highly trained group of combat specialists numbered at the time approximately 2,000 men.
An assessment of insurgent strategy, particularly as it was being practiced at the time in the Republic of Vietnam, indicated that good use could be made there of the U.S. Army Special Forces. The requirement for a unit that was combat-oriented, capable of performing with relative independence in the field, ruggedly trained for guerrilla operations, and geared for co-operation with the Vietnamese was admirably met in the organization, training, equipment, and operational procedures of the U.S. Army Special Forces.
In November 1961 the first medical specialist troops of the Special Forces were employed in Vietnam in a project originally designed to provide assistance to the Montagnard tribes in the high-plateau country around Pleiku. Out of this modest beginning grew one of the most successful programs for using civilian forces ever devised by a military force-the Civilian Irregular Defense Group. Eventually the organization, development, and operation of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group proved to be the chief work of the U.S. Special Forces in the Vietnam War.
Despite the size and complexity of the program, however, the U.S. “Special Forces participated in a number of other activities in the course of their stay in Vietnam, including training, advisory, and operational missions. Any comprehensive story of what the Special Forces did in Vietnam must include some account of these missions. The nature, scope, and success of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program will nevertheless occupy a substantial part of this study.”
U.S. Special Forces occupied a somewhat unusual position vis-a-vis the Vietnamese Army, the Vietnamese Special Forces, and the indigenous population involved in the program. The rules of engagement specified that in most instances the U.S. Special Forces would serve, technically at least, in an advisory capacity to the Vietnamese Special Forces, which was charged with the direct command responsibility for the Civilian Irregular Defense Group. There were exceptions to this. For instance, the troops known as the mobile guerrilla forces were originally commanded and controlled directly by soldiers of the U.S. Special Forces. For the most part, however, the Vietnamese were in command; the Americans were there to assist them-not to assume any command. In practice, as will be seen, this arrangement was not firmly and universally adhered to from the start. There were degrees of compliance that varied considerably from one case to the next. Many of the early problems encountered by the Civilian Irregular Defense Group came from the U.S. Special Forces-Vietnamese Special Forces command and control structure imposed upon it. The obvious dilemma of two command figures, each with his own judgments, arose. No less a factor, especially in the years 1962 and 1963, was the mutual mistrust and dislike between the civilian irregulars, especially the Montagnards, and the Vietnamese military men who were commanding them.
The U.S. Special Forces had been created by the Army for the purpose of waging unconventional warfare, which by 1964 was defined in the Dictionary of united States Army Terms as “The three inter-related fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states. Unconventional warfare, operations,” the dictionary stated, “are conducted within enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.”
The Special Forces was defined in Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations, in terms of its role, mission, and capabilities. Its role was to assume any responsibility and carry out any mission assigned to it by the Army. Its missions were many and varied because of the Special Forces’ organization, flexible command arrangements, tailored logistical and fiscal procedures, and highly trained men. Chief among them were planning, conducting, and supporting unconventional warfare and internal security, or “stability” operations. Special Forces troops were capable of training, advising, and providing operational, logistical, and fiscal support for foreign military or paramilitary forces. They were able to infiltrate by air, land, or water, sometimes penetrating deep into enemy territory for the purpose of attacking strategic targets, rescuing friendly troops, or collecting intelligence. Special Forces troops also trained other American and allied forces in Special Forces techniques. To a large extent these definitions were determined by the problems that faced the Army and how the Army used the .Special Forces to solve them. The Special Forces units evolved in response to the demands placed upon them.
The basic structure of the Special Forces Group (Airborne) consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, three or more line Special Forces companies, a signal company, and an aviation detachment. The headquarters and headquarters company encompassed all the usual staff sections for command and control, as well as the major portion of the group medical capability and the parachute rigging and air delivery elements. The line Special Forces company was commanded by a lieutenant colonel and was normally composed of an administrative detachment and an operations detachment C, which commanded three operations detachment B’s, each of which commanded four operations detachment A’s. The A detachment was the basic twelve-man unit of the Special Forces. Supporting the entire group with communications was the signal company, which, in terms of personnel, technical equipment, and communications capabilities, resembled a battalion more than it did the usualsignal company.
In the early years of Special Forces involvement in Vietnam, 1961-1965, the concept of how best to employ the forces was developed, put into practice, and adjusted empirically. The government of the United States and the government of South Vietnam were dealing with a Communist-inspired insurgency, and for the United States it was a new experience. Many local tactics were attempted on a “let’s-try-it-and-see-what-happens” basis. If something worked, then it became an acceptable counterinsurgency tactic; if it did not, it was dropped.
During these formative years, it became clear that the part the U.S. Special Forces was to play would differ from the role foreseen for it when it was created in the 1950s. At that time, the troops of the force as organized were capable of waging unconventional war under conventional war conditions. The war in Vietnam, however, never fell smoothly into the conventional category. In Vietnam “enemy or enemy-controlled territory” was the countryside of South Vietnam, the government of which had invited U.S. military presence. The enemy insurgents were guerrillas themselves. Instead of waging guerrilla warfare against conventional forces in enemy territory, the U.S. Special Forces troops were to find themselves attempting to thwart guerrilla insurgency in “friendly” territory.
At first the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program was concerned with what was called area development. The goal was to provide an area with security from Viet Cong influence and terror, to help the people develop their own self-defense program, and, if possible, to enlist support for the government of Vietnam from its own citizens. Operations took an offensive turn only because many of the areas involved were already effectively controlled by the Viet Cong.
In late 1960 the response of the governments of Vietnam and the United States, whose military involvement at that time consisted of the presence of a Military Assistance Advisory Group, to the mounting Communist insurgency was to increase the size and effectiveness of Vietnam’s conventional military forces. For the most part, these did not include the ethnic and religious minority groups in the highlands of the central and northern portions of South Vietnam and in the rural lowlands of the Mekong Delta. Under the sponsorship of the U.S. Mission in Saigon several programs were initiated in late 1961 to keep these minority groups from falling under the control of the Viet Cong. U.S. Special Forces detachments were assigned to the U.S. Mission to provide training and advice for the programs, the first of which was among the Montagnards. Based primarily on the success of a pilot project involving the Rhade tribe around the village of Buon Enao in Darlac Province, the principal program centered on establishing area development centers in remote areas where there was little government control. The area development centers were bases of operation at which Special Forces detachments, working through Vietnamese Special Forces counterparts, assisted in the establishment of village defense systems based on elementary training in small arms and mortars, with minimum tactics designed for squads and with occasional platoon maneuvers. The purpose of the program was to extend government control into areas where it was lacking and to generate in the local populace a more favorable attitude toward the government. It should be clearly understood that the United States initiated this program and encouraged it. The Vietnam government participated by employing the Vietnamese Special Forces, but the program was essentially an American project. In the beginning the local Vietnamese province-sector officials were less than enthusiastic.
In 1963 the area development program expanded toward the western borders of Vietnam. In 1964 the Civilian Irregular Defense Group assumed other missions calling for operations against Viet Cong war zones or so-called safe havens and the interdiction of Viet Cong infiltration routes in Vietnam. The Special Forces continuing commitment in terms of men involved in the CIDG program grew from one medical noncommissioned officer at Buon Enao in October 1961 to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), numbering over 1,200 in October 1964.
In terms of program management and control, the early years can be divided into three periods: from November 1961 to November 1962 when the U.S. Mission was responsible for the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program; from September 1962 to July 1963 during which responsibility for operations was gradually turned over to the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and the Army; and, finally, from July 1963 to the spring of 1965, when the conventional U.S. buildup began during which the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, bore full responsibility for the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program. Throughout the early years, the Special Forces effort with civilian irregulars was characterized by rapid expansion, was dispersed over a wide area, and was subject to changing emphasis in missions. The program developed along largely unplanned lines in response to changing needs and opportunities.
From 1961 to 1965 more than eighty CIDG camps or area development centers were established. Many were built from the ground up (and down) in areas where the government had no effective control. Each camp was a self-contained and comprehensive counterinsurgency effort. U.S. Special Forces men provided advice and assistance in all aspects of camp administration and operations throughout each project site’s existence, from initiation to turnover of the camp and its paramilitary assets to local Vietnamese authorities.
When the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, began to assume responsibility for the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program in the fall of 1962, Special Forces detachments made the first assessments of areas in the selection of proposed campsites. Security was the prime consideration when the irregulars arrived at a new site. Often security forces from established camps were brought in until local forces could be recruited and trained.
Camp security occupied a major portion of the Special Forces detachment’s time and effort. Few fortified camps were built in the early part of the program, but as it evolved the new camps were placed in “hot areas” and therefore required much more attention in both defense and security. Throughout the period, the Viet Cong harassed campsites and attacked several in reinforced battalion strength, with occasional success. After the successful attack on the camp at Hiep Hoa in November 1963, more emphasis was placed on making the camps strongly fortified positions.
One of the primary missions of Special Forces men at a camp was to advise and assist in the training of paramilitary forces recruited in that area. The Special Forces training program generally concentrated on strike force troops, although the Special Forces did participate in the training of hamlet militia, mountain scouts, and other irregular forces. The main problem in training civilian irregular troops was establishing the respective roles of U.S. Special Forces and Vietnamese Special Forces. Theoretically, all training was a Vietnamese Special Forces responsibility, but most Vietnamese detachments were either unwilling or unable to undertake it.
Strike force operations consisted for the most part of patrols. Hundreds of contacts with the enemy occurred, and many small actions were fought. There was also a fair number of joint operations with regular Vietnam Army and Regional Forces units, particularly in 1964. In most operations, the major hindrance to success was the lack of accurate and timely intelligence. The U.S. Special Forces men, aware of the importance of gathering intelligence, tried to emphasize that aspect of their missions and to set up intelligence nets that would produce information on the location of Viet Cong units and members of the local Viet Cong political organization. At the beginning of the program, there was no standing operating procedure for the procurement of intelligence. Each Special Forces detachment commander found it necessary to make working arrangements with his Vietnamese Special Forces counterpart with regard to intelligence. Even after an agreement was finally reached in the spring of 1964, the Vietnamese Special Forces units were slow to accept U.S. Special Forces participation in intelligence operations. The language barrier proved to be a major obstacle to the U.S. Army in recruiting agents and acquiring information.
Perhaps the major problem encountered by U.S. Special Forces men in carrying out their mission with the civilian irregulars was their relationship with their Vietnamese counterparts. From the beginning of the program the role of the U.S. Special Forces detachment commander was to have been strictly advisory. All important responsibilities were to be assumed by the Vietnamese Special Forces, but unfortunately these were rarely shouldered by the Vietnamese Special Forces alone. To complicate the problem there were two vertical chains of command, with appropriate levels of horizontal counterpart co-ordination required up through the two commands. U.S. Special Forces men at this time, moreover, had received little training or indoctrination on what to expect from their Vietnamese counterparts, how to get along with them, and how to accomplish the operational mission through them.
The logistics involved in administering and resupplying the widely dispersed camps required unorthodox requisitioning and procurement procedures. The command and control structure up until May 1964 was unique because the nature of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program demanded it. When conventional forces worked in conjunction with civilian irregular forces, however, this unconventional structure placed an exceptional burden of co-ordination on the Special Forces.
Counterguerrilla operations by strike force units were only a part of the counterinsurgency program at Civilian Irregular Defense Group sites. Civic action and psychological operations were also conducted as part of the Special Forces mission. Their objective was to raise the living standard of the people, to develop their identity with and their loyalty to the government, and to enlist their active support in defeating insurgents. The work of the detachment medical men was a major contribution to this effort. Throughout the period, however, these programs were hampered by the inability of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and other security forces to provide adequate protection to the local population against Viet Cong attacks and terrorism, poorly motivated local government representatives, and the lack of professionally qualified U.S. soldiers who knew the area to augment the Special Forces detachment for its civic action and psychological operations mission. In spite of these problems, Special Forces men on their own initiative accomplished many worthwhile civic action projects in this period. Emphasis is usually placed on the role the Special Forces played as soldiers in Vietnam. They were soldiers and good ones. But they were more than soldiers; they were, in a way, community developers in uniform too. The civic action accomplishments of the Special Forces are as much a source of pride to them as their accomplishments in the military arena, and justifiably so.
U.S. Army Special Forces
CMH Publication 90-23
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 1989 (First Printed, 1973)[/toggle_content]
Special Forces units perform 7 doctrinal missions: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, Combatting Terrorism, Counter-proliferation, and Information Operations. These missions make Special Forces unique in the US military, because they are employed throughout the 3 stages of the operational continuum: peacetime, conflict and war. As of 2005, Special Forces units had only performed 5 doctrinal missions: Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action and Counter-Terrorism.
Special Forces Command’s Unconventional Warfare capabilities provide a viable military option for a variety of operational taskings that are inappropriate or infeasible for conventional forces, making it the US military’s premier unconventional warfare force. Unconventional Warfare (UW) included a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive area. UW included, but was not limited to, guerilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature.
Foreign Internal Defense operations, Special Force’s main peacetime mission, are designed to help friendly developing nations by working with their military and police forces to improve their technical skills, understanding of human rights issues, and to help with humanitarian and civic action projects.
Often SF units are required to perform additional, or collateral, activities outside their primary missions. These collateral activities are coalition warfare/support, combat search and rescue, security assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian de-mining and counter-drug operations.
Coalition warfare/support emerged as a result of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and continued in both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. This activity ensures the ability of a wide variety of foreign troops to work together effectively in a wide variety of military exercises or operations.
US Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) exercises command and control over 5 active component Special Forces groups and 2 Army National Guard Special Forces Groups. As of 2005, it had only exercised training oversight over the National Guards Special Forces groups. US Army Special Forces Command had exercised similar authority over 2 US Army Reserve Special Forces groups, before these were inactivated in 1995. Unlike any other divisional-sized unit, US Army Special Forces Command was not located in one place, but spread out from coast-to-coast and throughout the world.
As of 2005, each group had 3 battalions, a group support company, and a headquarters company (otherwise known as a Special Forces Operational Detachment C or C-team). Each of the battalions had 3 Special Forces companies, a battalion support company, and a headquarters detachment (otherwise known as a Special Forces Operational Detachment B or B-team). The companies had 6 Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFOD-A), or A-teams, assigned to them. The SFOD-A was the heart and soul of Special Forces operations. Beginning in late 2008, as part of a restructuring and expansion of US Army Special Forces capabilities, the active component groups began to active a fourth battalion.
Each Special Forces Group was regionally oriented to support one of the war fighting commanders-in-chief (CINCs). Special Forces soldiers routinely deployed in support of the CINCs of US European Command, US Atlantic Command, US Pacific Command, US Southern Command, and the US Central Command.
In defense planning, decision makers looked to Special Operations Forces to provide a strategic economy of force in support of conventional forces; to expand the range of available options; and to provide unique capabilities. US Army Special Forces were seen as “Force Multipliers.” It was said that a 12 man Special Forces A-Team could render the fighting power of a light infantry company.
Special operations forces reinforced, augmented, supplemented, and complemented conventional forces before, during, and after a conflict, thereby increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of any military effort. For instance, special operations forces could be used early in an operation to prevent conflict and conserve resources. When conflict was imminent, special operations forces might be employed in a variety of prehostility missions to signal determination, demonstrate support to allies, and begin the complicated processes of positioning forces for combat and preparing the battlefield.
During conflict, special operations forces might be most effective in conducting economy-of-force operations, generating strategic advantage disproportionate to the resources they represent. Special operations forces could locate, seize, or destroy strategic targets; obtain critical intelligence; test an enemy’s defenses; diminish his prestige; disorganize, disrupt, and demoralize his troops; and divert important resources.
Special operations forces expanded the options of the National Command Authorities, particularly in crises and contingencies, such as terrorism, insurgency, subversion, and sabotage, that fell between wholly diplomatic initiatives and overt use of large conventional forces. Special operations forces allowed decision makers the flexibility to tailor US responses to encompass a wide range of possibilities. Their small size, ability to react rapidly, and relatively self-sufficient nature provided the United States with military options that did not entail the risk of escalation normally associated when larger, more visible, conventional forces were employed. This enabled decision makers to prevent a conflict or limit its scope and, therefore, better control US forces and resources once they had been committed. Special operations forces were the best choice for actions requiring a rapid response or a surgically precise, focused use of force.
Decision makers might choose the special operations forces option because it provided the broadest range of capabilities that had direct applicability in an increasing number of missions-whether military, humanitarian, or peace operations-in support of US foreign policy.
Special operations forces training was some of the most rigorous in the world, and it produced some of the most professional and expert military operators. They were mature forces who demonstrated superior performance in small groups or as part of an integrated US response with other military forces, as well as non-Department of Defense government and civilian agencies.
The small, self-contained units could work swiftly and quietly without the noticeable presence of conventional military troops. Even under the most austere conditions, they were able to operate without the infrastructure often needed by a larger force. As a result, these units could penetrate enemy territory on missions such as personnel recovery; surgical strikes prior to conventional force operations; intelligence gathering; and pathfinding and target designation for air strikes. Special operatiosn forces also employed an extraordinary inventory of sophisticated weapons and technology. Often special operations forces units acted as a proving ground for new equipment before it was transferred to conventional forces.
Although a superior military force, special operatiosn forces did not necessarily need to use military force in a mission. Language skills, cross-cultural training, regional orientation, and understanding of the political context of their operating arenas made them unparalleled in the US military. Their skills enabled them to work as effectively with civilian populations as they did with other military forces to influence situations favorably toward US national interests. This ability to apply discrete leverage was one of special operation forces’ most important contributions to US national military strategy.
In an era of regional focus, reduced forward-based forces, decreasing resources, and growing uncertainty, special operatiosn forces played a critical role in US defense strategy by providing strategic economy of force, expanded options, and unique capabilities. Special operations forces gave the United States efficiency without compromising effectiveness and flexibility to respond to the unforeseen and unexpected.
Special Forces Career Management Field (CMF) 18 included positions concerned with the employment of highly specialized elements to accomplish specially directed missions in times of peace and war. Many of these missions were conducted at times when employment of conventional military forces was not feasible or was not considered in the best interest of the United States. Training for and participation in these missions was arduous, somewhat hazardous, and was often sensitive in nature. For these reasons, every prospective Special Forces soldier had to successfully complete the 3-week Special Forces Selection and Assessment (SFAS) Course. The purpose of SFAS was to identify soldier’s who had potential for Special Forces training. The program assessed tactical skills, leadership, physical fitness, motivation, and ability to cope with stress. Activities included psychology tests, physical fitness, and swim test, runs, obstacle courses, rucksack marches, small unit tactics, and military orienteering/land nav exercises.
Each Special Forces volunteer would receive extensive training in a specialty that prepared him for his future assignment in an Special Forces unit. Special Forces units were designed to operate either unilaterally or in support of and combined with native military and paramilitary forces. Levels of employment for Special Operations forces included advising and assisting host governments, involvement in continental United States-based training, and direct participation in combat operations. The Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) taught and developed the skills necessary for effective utilization of the Special Forces solider. Duties in CMF 18 primarily involved participation in Special Operations interrelated fields of UW. These included foreign internal defense and direct action missions, as part of a small operations team or detachment. Duties at other levels involved command, control, and support functions. Frequently, duties required regional orientation to include foreign language training and in-country experience. Special Forces placed emphasis not only on unconventional tactics, but also on knowledge of nations in waterborne, desert, jungle, mountain, or arctic operations.
US Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) traces its lineage to the 1st Special Service Force, “the Devil’s Brigade,” and derives its heritage from elements of the Office of Strategic Services (Jedburghs, Operational Groups and Detachment 101).
The OSS was formed in World War II to gather intelligence and conduct operations behind enemy lines in support of resistance groups in Europe and Burma. After the war, individuals such as Colonel Aaron Bank, Colonel Wendell Fertig and Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann used their wartime OSS experience to formulate the doctrine of unconventional warfare that became the cornerstone of the Special Forces. The 1st Special Service Force, by contrast, was an elite combined Canadian-American infantry unit that fought in North Africa, Italy and Southern France.
Special Forces grew out of the establishment of the Special Operations Division of the Psychological Warfare Center activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in May 1952. In June of 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was established under Colonel Aaron Bank. Concurrently with this was the establishment of the Psychological Warfare School, which subsequently became the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) deployed to Bad Tolz, Germany in September 1953. The remaining cadre at Fort Bragg formed the 77th Special Forces Group. The intervening years saw the number of Special Forces Groups rise and fall.
Special Forces Soldiers first saw combat in 1953, as individuals deployed from 10th Special Forces Group to Korea. These men worked with the partisan forces conducting operations behind the enemy lines. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, teams of Special Forces soldiers deployed to Laos to work with the Royal Laotian Army. Operation White Star was the precursor to Special Forces operations in Vietnam. In Vietnam, Special Forces teams worked as advisors to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the Civilian Irregular Defense (CIDG) Program forces; trained and led quick reaction units called MIKE Forces; and conducted cross-border operations as part of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG). 5th Special Forces Group was formed as the requirement for Special Forces troops grew. In the 14 years Special Forces were in Vietnam, they established a record for bravery and proficiency second to none.
The 3 decades following Vietnam witnessed Special Forces participation in virtually every campaign fought by the US Army. In Grenada, Haiti, Panama and in the Balkans, Special Forces teams conducted unconventional warfare operations in support of the regular Army. In Operation Desert Storm, General Norman H. Schwarzkopf described the Special Forces as “the eyes and ears” of the conventional forces and the “glue that held the coalition together.”
In the midst of these missions, on 27 November 1990, the US Army’s 1st Special Operations Command was redesignated as the US Army Special Forces Command (Airborne). Its mission was to train, validate, and prepare Special Forces units to deploy and execute operational requirements for the war-fighting commanders-in-chief.
In the post 9-11 Global War on Terrorism, Special Forces teams were instrumental in establishing the Northern Alliance coalition that ousted the Taliban government in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom and were critical to the success of the Coalition ground campaign in Iraq. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Special Forces teams trained and fought with the Kurds in northern Iraq, cleared the western desert of SCUD missiles and provided long-range special reconnaissance to the Coalition ground forces on the drive to Baghdad.
Special Forces soldiers had also served at home and abroad providing humanitarian assistance and assisting with foreign internal defense in friendly foreign nations. Humanitarian assistance missions included Promote Liberty, Provide Comfort, Sea Angel, the domestic response to Hurricane Andrew, and Restore Hope.[/toggle_content]
The primary operational element of a Special Forces company, an Special Forces Operational Detachment A, also known as an “A Detachment” or “A-Team,” consists of 12 Special Forces Soldiers: 2 officers, and 10 sergeants. All team members are Special Forces qualified and cross-trained in different skills. They are also multi-lingual. The A-Team is almost unlimited in its capabilities to operate in hostile or denied areas. A-Teams can infiltrate and exfiltrate their area of operations by air, land, or sea. An A-Team can operate for an indefinite period of time in remote locations with little or no outside support. They are truly independent, self-sustaining “detachments.” A-Teams routinely train, advise and assist other US and allied forces and other agencies while standing by to perform other special operations as directed by higher authorities. All detachment members are capable of advising, assisting, and directing foreign counterparts in their function up through battalion level.
Capabilities of the highly-versatile A-team include: plan and conduct SF operations separately or as part of a larger force; infiltrate and exfiltrate specified operational areas by air, land, or sea; conduct operations in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods of time with a minimum of external direction and support; develop, organize, equip, train and advise or direct indigenous forces up to battalion size in special operations; train, advise and assist other US and allied forces and agencies; plan and conduct unilateral SF operations; and perform other special operations as directed by higher authority.
In the SF company, one of the 6 A-teams is trained in combat diving and one is trained in military free-fall parachuting. Both are used as methods of infiltration. The detachment can serve as a manpower pool from which SF commanders organize tailored SF teams to perform specific missions.
In general, A-teams are equipped with communications, i.e. tactical satellite communications, high-frequency radios, and global positioning system. Medical kits include laboratory and dental instruments and supplies, sterilizer, resuscitator-aspirator, water-testing kits and veterinary equipment. Other key equipment includes individual and perimeter defense weapons as well as electric and non-electric demolitions and night-vision devices.
Equipment distribution may be geared to conform to specific missions. For underwater or waterborne infiltration, scuba teams are equipped with open-circuit twin 80s SCUBA tanks, closed-circuit Dragger (rebreather) Lar-V, Zodiac boat and Klepper kayaks. Military free-fall parachuting teams use ram-air parachutes and oxygen systems.
SFOD-A “A-Team” Structure
A captain leads the 12-man team. Second in command is a warrant officer. Two noncommissioned officers, or NCOs, trained in each of the five SF functional areas: weapons, engineer, medical, communications, and operations and intelligence comprise the remainder of the team. All team members are SF qualified and cross-trained in different skills, as well as being multi-lingual.
(1 per “A Team”)
Rank: 0-3, Captain
First In Command. The Detachment Commander is responsible for ensuring and maintaining the operational readiness and all other aspects of the A-Team. He may command or advise an indigenous combat force up to battalion size.
(1 per “A-Team”)
Rank: W0-1 & up
He commands in the absence of the detachment commander; serves as technical and tactical authority in all aspects of Special Forces operations; supervises all staff activities; is the psychological operations (PSYOPs) and Civil Affairs authority; has cultural, regional, and linguistic abilities; manages the mid-term and long-term planning. He can recruit, organize, train, and supervise indigenous combat forces up to battalion size.
18 Zulu – SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS SERGEANT
(1 per “A Team”)
Team Sergeant (Rank: E-8, Master Sergeant)
The Team Sergeant is the senior enlisted man on the Team. He is responsible for overseeing all Team operations and managing all enlisted personnel on the Team. Sometimes known as the “Team Daddy”, he is usually the person who actually runs the Team. He can recruit, organize, train, and supervise indigenous combat forces up to battalion size.
18 Fox – ASSISTANT OPERATIONS SERGEANT
(1 per “A Team”)
O&I Sergeant (Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class)
Assists the Team Sergeant in operating the Team. Plans, coordinates, and directs the A-Team’s intelligence, collection, analysis, production and dissemination. He field interrogates and processes enemy prisoners of war. He briefs and debriefs friendly patrols. He can train, advise, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.
18 Bravo – SPECIAL FORCES WEAPONS SERGEANT
(2 per “A Team”)
Weapons Sergeant (Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class)
Asst. Weapons Sergeant (Rank: E-6, Staff Sergeant)
The weapons experts. Capable of firing and employing nearly every small arm and crew served weapon in the world; such as pistols, rifles, machine guns, mortars, anti-tank guns, and grenade launchers. They also train detachment members and indigenous combat forces in the use of these weapons. The two weapons sergeants employ conventional and unconventional tactics and techniques as tactical mission leaders. They are responsible for the tactical security of the A-Team. Each can train, advise, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.
18 Charlie – SPECIAL FORCES ENGINEER SERGEANT
(2 per “A Team)
Engineer Sergeant (Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class)
Asst. Engineer Sergeant (Rank: E-6, Staff Sergeant)
The demolitions experts. He can build as well as destroy almost any structure. The SF “Demo Man” is capable of constructing everything from an outhouse to a schoolhouse. A key player in any civic action mission. Each can train, advise, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.
18 Delta – SPECIAL FORCES MEDICAL SERGEANT
(2 per “A Team”)
Medical Sergeant (Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class)
Asst. Medical Sergeant (Rank: E-6, Staff Sergeant)
The life-saver. Not your average “medic”. The SF medic employs the latest in field medical technology and limited surgical procedures. He is capable of managing any battlefield trauma injury, as well as administering preventative medicine. The SF Medic is in an integral part of civic action programs in bringing medical treatment to native populations. SF medics also become “paramedics” upon completion of their SF medical training. Their capabilities include: Advanced Trauma Life Support, limited surgery, dentistry, and even veterinarian procedures. Each can train, advise, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.
18 Echo – SPECIAL FORCES COMMUNICATIONS SERGEANT
(2 per “A Team”)
Communications Sergeant (Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class)
Asst. Communications Sergeant (Rank: E-6, Staff Sergeant)
The “Commo Guy” – The lifeline. His responsibility is to establish and maintain communications. He employs the latest FM, multi-channel, and satellite communications devices (he also carries the heaviest rucksack on the Team). The SF Commo sergeant is an invaluable and vital part of all SF missions. Each can train, advise, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.[/toggle_content]
The Special Forces company headquarters, also known as a Special Forces Operational Detachment Bravo, “B Detachment,” or “B Team,” is a multi-purpose C2 element with many employment options. It cannot isolate and deploy Special Forces teams independently without significant augmentation. An Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (“A Team”) cannot deploy or operate without the support of the B Team. The B Team consists of 11 personnel and is the headquarters element of the Special Forces company. It acts as the command and control of the A Teams within the company. The B-Team establishes and operates the Advanced Operational Base (AOB). The B Team can and does: Plan and conduct SF operations separately or as part of a larger force; train and prepare Special Forces A-Teams for deployment; infiltrate and exfiltrate operational areas by air, land, or sea; conduct operations in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods of time with minimal external direction or support; Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise or direct indigenous combat forces up to regimental size in Special Operations (SO); and train, advise, and assist other US and allied forces and agencies.
SFOD-B “B-Team” Structure
SPECIAL FORCES COMPANY COMMANDER (CO)
Rank: 0-4, Major
The Company Commander exercises command of the personnel and elements assigned or attached to the company. When the company establishes an AOB, he serves as the AOB commander.
EXECUTIVE OFFICER (XO)
Rank: 0-3, Captain
He directs the company staff and assigns specific responsibilities. He coordinates with the company sergeant major to direct and supervise company administrative and logistical procedures.
Rank: W0-1 and up, Warrant Officer
He has staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to the organization, training, intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) activities, and combat operations of the company and it’s detachments.
18 Zulu- COMPANY SERGEANT MAJOR
Rank: E-9, Sergeant Major
He is the senior enlisted person in the company and the commander’s principal advisor on matters pertaining to enlisted personnel. He supervises the daily training, operations, and administration of the company.
18 Zulu – SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS SERGEANT
Rank: E-8, Master Sergeant
He assists the XO and Company Technician in accomplishing their duties. When the company and it’s detachments are uncommitted, they manage the company’s training program for the company commander.
18 Fox – ASST. OPERATIONS SERGEANT
Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class
He assists the Operations Sergeant in the accomplishment of his duties.
18 Delta – SPECIAL FORCES MEDICAL SERGEANT
Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class
He provides routine, preventative, and emergency medical care to the company and any indigenous forces. He also trains allied and indigenous forces in basic emergency and preventative medical care. He gathers medical information and advises the company staff on all health care matters.
18 Echo – SPECIAL FORCES COMMUNICATIONS SERGEANT
(2 per “B Team”)
Communications Sergeant (Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class)
Asst. Communications Sergeant (Rank: E-6, Staff Sergeant)
The commo sergeants advise the Company Commander on communication matters, and prepares communication plans. They install, operate, and maintain all the company’s communication equipment. They also train detachment members and indigenous forces in signal equipment procedures.
Rank: E-6, Staff Sergeant
He is the principal logistical planner. He coordinates closely with the battalion S-4 and service detachment commander to meet the unique needs of the company and it’s detachments.
Rank: E-5, Sergeant
He supervises, operates, and maintains the company’s NBC detection and contamination equipment. He also assists in establishing, administering, and applying NBC defensive measures.[/toggle_content]
Assesses and selects soldiers for attendance at the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).
This program allows SF an opportunity to assess each soldier’s capabilities by testing his physical, emotional, and mental stamina. The SFAS also allows each soldier the opportunity to make a meaningful and educated decision about SF and his career plan.[hr]
Soldiers attend SFAS on a temporary duty status
You should plan to be at Fort Bragg, North Carolina for up to 30 days.
You will be trained in all military subjects used in the assessment.
The course is individual cross country land navigation based covering distances from 18 kilometers up to on or about 50 kilometers.
The distances and weight carried increase during the course, but being prepared mentally and physically for the events cannot be over emphasized.[hr]
Levels of Employment for Special Operations Forces:[bulleted_list style=”disc-gray”]
- Advising and Assisting Host Governments
- Continental United States-based training
- Direct participation in Combat Operations.
Special Forces Career Management Field (CMF) 18 includes positions concerned with the employment of highly specialized elements to accomplish specially directed missions in times of peace and war.
Many of these missions are conducted at times when employment of conventional military forces is not feasible or not considered in the best interest of the United States.
Training for and participation in these missions is arduous, somewhat hazardous, and are often sensitive in nature.
For these reasons, every prospective Special Forces Soldier must successfully complete the 3-week SFAS Course.[hr]
Be prepared for anything at SFAS
This is the place where “Your Mind is Your Best Weapon”
Perfect physical condition alone will not get you through SFAS
The SFAS Course assesses and selects soldiers for attendance at the SFQC[hr] [headline h=”4″]Stress in SFAS[/headline]
The purpose of SFAS is to Identify Soldiers who have potential for Special Forces Training.[headline h=”4″]The Program Assesses:[/headline] [bulleted_list style=”disc-gray”]
- Tactical Skills
- Physical Fitness
- Ability to Cope with Stress
- Psychology Tests
- Physical Fitness
- Swim Test
- Obstacle Courses
- Rucksack Marches
- Small Unit Tactics
- Military Orienteering/Land Navigation Exercises.
When you report to Fort Bragg, North Carolina
You should be at 100 percent physical ability with zero percent stress level.
Any of the following might cause you stress while attending SFAS:[bulleted_list style=”disc-gray”]
- Wife not in agreement with you.
- Financial problems at home.
- Medical problems with yourself or family.
- Not sure SF is what you want.
- Low self-esteem or lack of motivation.
- Not in top physical shape for SFAS.
- Just to escape your present unit or duty assignment.
During this period, Soldiers In-Process, and are Trained on common skills for CMF 18 skill level three.
Training is long and is taught at the Camp Rowe Training Facility.
Camp Mackall is a Training area 35 miles southwest of Fort Bragg[headline h=”4″]The training covered during this phase includes: [/headline] [numbered_list]
- Advanced Map Reading
- Land Navigation (Cross-Country)
- Survival Air Operations
- Special Operations Techniques
- Miscellaneous General Subjects
- Small Unit Tactics
This phase culminates with a Special Operations Overview.
The emphasis is on Training which enables the Student to:
Navigate Operate and Survive in Isolated Rugged Terrain, Day or Night, By Himself.[/toggle_content] [toggle_content title=”SFQC Phase 2, MOS Qualification”] [headline h=”4″]65 days – MOS Qualification Phase[/headline] For the enlisted soldier, the decision concerning the four specialties will be made based on your Training Background, Aptitude, and Desire and the needs of CMF 18
Training for this phase culminates with a mission planning cycle. During this phase, soldiers are trained in their different specialties:[bulleted_list style=”disc-gray”]
- 18A – SF Detachment Commander. Training includes: teaching the officer student the planning and leadership skills he will need to direct and employ other members of his detachment. Training is conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and is 26 weeks long.
- 18B – SF Weapons Sergeant. Training includes: Tactics, anti-armor weapons utilization, functioning of all types of U.S. and foreign light weapons, indirect fire operations, manportable air defense weapons, weapons emplacement, and integrated combined arms fire control planning. Training is conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and is 24 weeks long.
- 18C – SF Engineer Sergeant. Training includes: Construction skills, field fortifications, and use of explosive demolitions. Training is conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and is 24 weeks long.
- 18D – SF Medical Sergeant. Training includes: Advanced medical procedures to include trauma management and surgical procedures. Training is conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and is approximately 57 weeks long.
- 18E – SF Communications Sergeant. Training includes: Installation and operation of SF high frequency and burst communications equipment, antenna theory, radio wave propagation, and SF communication operations procedures and techniques. Training culminates with an around-the-world communications field performance exercise.
Specialty training is primarily designed to make students technically proficient in their field.
However, rigorous physical training and field exercises are incorporated into the training to ready the students for the physical and mental stresses they will encounter in later phases of their qualification course and in operations when they join their units.[/toggle_content]
[toggle_content title=”SFQC Phase 3, Collective Training”]
[headline h=”4″]Phase 3 Training – 38 Days
Collective Training to “Robin Sage”[/headline]
The field training exercise integrates and reinforces both specialty and common skills training. Students are organized into operating detachments to practice, in a realistic environment, all the training previously received. They have the opportunity to deal with simulated “guerrillas” as they would in an operational situation. Students are hunted by “enemy” forces and attack targets manned by live defenders. Upon finishing the field exercise, the students are ready for the operations they will conduct after graduation as members of one of the Special Forces groups.
Soldiers are trained in Special Operations (SO) classes:[bulleted_list style=”disc-gray”]
- Air Operations
- Unconventional Warfare classes
- Direct Action (DA) Isolation
- Culminates with ROBIN SAGE.
JFK Special Warfare Center and School
SERE/Terrorism Counteraction Department
The SERE/Terrorism Counteraction Department teaches
courses in two areas –
Courses designed to help military personnel avoid capture or exploitation by the enemy, and
Courses designed to make military and civilian students more aware of terrorism and protective measures against it.
The SERE Instructor Qualification Course trains NCOs and officers in survival fieldcraft, evasion techniques, resistance to interrogation and escape. The training is geared to what an evading soldier may need to know to be able to return to friendly control and, at the same time, not be detected by the enemy.
This approach gives soldiers the skill and confidence to evade through enemy-controlled areas while surviving under varying environmental conditions. Training is not all physical, but involves much intensive academic study as well as hands-on application of the skills taught.
The final phase of SERE training is a graded exercise which requires the student to apply all the training he has received. SERE course graduates receive a packet of reference materials and lesson plans so they can return to their units and teach a unit-level SERE course.[headline h=”4″]SERE Level-C Training[/headline]
The department also teaches the SERE Level-C training course to soldiers who are in a high- risk-of-capture category, which includes Special Forces, Rangers and aviators. The course is designed to give students the skill to survive and evade capture or, if captured, to resist interrogation or exploitation and plan their escape. The course includes a classroom phase, a field phase and a resistance training laboratory which simulates the environment of a prisoner-of-war compound.[headline h=”4″]Terrorism in Low-intensity Conflict[/headline]
Terrorism in Low-Intensity Conflict is intended for higher-ranking NCOs, warrant off ice and officers. Students are, or will be, assigned to units or staff activities that have overseas missions, such as peacekeeping forces, military groups, mobile training teams or participants in training exercises hold in low-intensity conflict areas. The course trains senior-level planners and commanders to better understand the terrorism threat.[headline h=”4″]Individual Terrorism Awareness Course[/headline]
Individual Terrorism Awareness is designed for persons going overseas in moderate-to-high-risk assignments, including military training teams and Defense Attache Office personnel. Students receive an introduction to the terrorist threat and are taught how to reduce the chance of identification and attack by terrorists as well as how to react and survive in a hostage situation.[headline h=”4″]Anti-terrorism Instructor Qualification Course[/headline]
The Anti-Terrorism Instructor Qualification Course is an intensive course which gives its students an introduction to terrorism and terrorist operations as well as instruction in self- protective measures and hostage survival techniques. Students also learn to teach others what they have learned, and they receive an instructor packet and briefing slides so they can give antiterrorist instruction to their units. This course and Individual terrorism Awareness can also be taught at other facilities by traveling instructor teams.[/toggle_content]