By Bill Spurgeon

An excerpt from Pucker Factor Stories of MACV SOG Vol.1 Issue 4: SOG Stories From the Veterans in Their Own Words by Jason B. Collins, published by Barnes & Noble Press, 12/08/24, pages 207-215, used with permission.

In January 1970, a 12-man team inserted into southeastern Laos with the mission to capture a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) truck driver on the Ho Chi Man Trail. This is my exact recollection of that mission, labeled Operation Ashtray.

In late 1969, Chief SOG, Colonel Steve Cavanaugh, charged LTC Frederick Abt, FOB-2 Commander, with the mission to ambush a North Vietnamese convoy in southeast Laos to capture a truck driver. It was believed that a truck driver would be very knowledgeable of the operation of the Ho-Chi-Man Trail and would provide the 7th Air Force with invaluable intelligence to support their B-52 bombing missions.

LTC Abt and his S-3 Officer, MAJ Frank Jaks, devised a plan which would become Operation Ashtray. The mission would require some of FOB-2’s most experienced recon team members with Jaks himself leading the effort. Nine recon personnel and two ARVN (Army Republic Viet Nam) Special Forces troops were selected to complete the 12-man team. MAJ Jaks organized his team into three elements: a 5-man snatch team, a two-man early warning element, and a 5-man diversion team. The Snatch Team, led by Jaks, consisted of Daniel Ster, Ray Harris, John Grant and Chuc (ARVN) and had the mission to ambush a truck and capture the driver. The Early Warning element of Tim Lynch and Michael Koropas was to position itself several hundred meters up the road and provide information to the Snatch Team as to what vehicles were coming and what they were carrying. The diversion element, led by SSG Oliver Hartwig, consisted of Recon Company First Sergeant Forest L. Todd, Bill Spurgeon, John Blaaw and one ARVN (unnamed). Their mission was to set an ambush 300-400 meters down the road from the snatch site to hit the next thing that came through their kill zone, after the Snatch Team initiated their ambush, in hopes of diverting NVA attention away from the Snatch Team.

To fully appreciate the mission of Operation Ashtray and the importance of capturing a truck driver one must first understand the operation of the Ho-Chi-Man Trail. Convoys were formed in North Vietnam and loaded with ammunition, weapons, supplies and personnel for transport to the South Vietnam border in support of the NVA war effort. Drivers did not drive a truck the entire way, instead, they drove only a fifteen-to-twenty-kilometer portion of the trip. Driver #1 would drive a truck from Checkpoint A south to Checkpoint B. At Checkpoint B, Driver#2 would continue in the truck to Checkpoint C while Driver #1 waited at Checkpoint B. As trucks were returning, Driver #1 would then drive the next truck heading north from Checkpoint B back to Checkpoint A where he passed it on to the next driver. With this compartmented approach, the driver would become intimately familiar with his stretch of the road and would be able to drive in blackout conditions to avoid detection by overflying aircraft. This made the driver an invaluable asset as a POW in that he knew locations of all truck parks, POL points, command centers, troop areas, caches, hospitals, ammo storage and other significant activities within his stretch of the road. This is why the capture of a truck driver was such a high priority to Chief SOG.

On January 13, 1970, MAJ Jaks called the team members into the TOC for a briefing on the operation. We were all given the opportunity to “volunteer” for the operation before he told us the mission. Of course, we all volunteered!The next day we traveled by C-130 Blackbird to SOG’s Naval Advisory Detachment SEAL base in Danang where we would train and rehearse for seven days. During this time, we experimented with several explosive charges that would stop a truck without killing the driver. Through a series of experiments, we determined that a series circuit of 4 claymores, approximately 5 feet apart, connected by Detonating Cord and aimed at the wheels of the truck would do the job. Without knowing the speed of the truck, this would give us a kill zone of about 20 feet to blow the front tire and hopefully stop the truck. We anticipated that the driver’s initial reaction would be to hit the brake and slow the forward momentum of the truck, giving the Snatch Team time to assault the truck and grab the driver. We tested the charge on a deadline 2 ½-ton truck, pulled by a Navy wrecker, on the beach in Danang to confirm our theory.

The photo shown below shows team members discussing the effects of the charge and the theory that it would stop a truck without killing the driver. I took this picture with my Penn-EE, which I left at the launch site in my personal baggage. This was the only photo of Operation Ashtray.

The plan called for the insertion of the 12-man team altogether on the same LZ. On the morning of Day 2, the team would split into two elements and move towards preselected general areas on Highway 110 to establish ambushes. The Early Warning Element would split off from the Snatch Team in the afternoon of Day 2 and move to its overwatch position. The Early Warning Element would monitor the road and relay information to the Snatch Team as to what was coming and when. The Snatch Team would then make the decision to initiate the ambush based on that information. After the POW was captured, the Snatch Team (with POW) would move to a pre-selected LZ for night extraction by helicopter. Flying the extraction aircraft would be the Aviation Battalion’s two most experienced pilots, the Battalion Commander and the Battalion S-3. They would be flying with PVS-5 night vision devices.

Early on the morning of 21 Jan the team traveled by C-130 Blackbird from Danang directly to the Command and Control Central (CCC) launch site at Dak To. From there the team was inserted by helicopter on a preselected L Z approximately 1500 meters from the highway. The team then moved approximately 400 meters away from the LZ and established a rest-over-night (RON) position. On the morning of Day 2 the team split into two elements; the Snatch Team and Early Warning Element led by Jaks and the Diversion Team led by Hartwig. Both elements then moved towards Highway 110 to establish ambush positions. The Early Warning element would split off from the Snatch Team later in the day and take up its position.

As the Snatch Team approached Highway 110, the brush was very thick and movement was extremely slow. They stopped within about 10 feet of the road to listen and could see the enemy’s legs as they walked back and forth along the road. Ray Harris, carrying a M-79, crouched beside the road looking through the vegetation. One sentry must have suspected something as he stopped, got down on his knees, and starred straight at Ray through a weak spot in the bramble. Ray squinted his eyes and as the NVA looked down that black hole of that 40mm M-79 pointed at his face, he calmly got up and walked back the way he had come from. From this point on, the Snatch Team was compromised. Fully expecting grenades and a potful of blind AK-47 fire coming in their direction, Jaks gave the order to withdraw. Rifle shots from sentries came down the road, one just in front to the south, and Jaks decided to scrub the Snatch Team mission. He radioed the Diversion Team to assume the mission if possible. Shortly after, trucks started moving along the highway. Using the noise of the truck traffic to cover their withdrawal, the team moved to their extraction LZ and set up for the night.

Late in the afternoon, the Diversion Team reached the highway. As luck would have it there was a bomb crater directly across the road on the uphill side that would provide a perfect overwatch position. The bomb crater provided cover and concealment and protection from the blast of the claymores. Late in the day the team placed the claymores in place and the kill zone was established. As I was the demo man on the team, also armed with a M-79, I held the clacker for the claymores. Additional claymores were placed on each flank, complete with a canteen of CS powder. Shortly thereafter we received a message from Jaks that the Snatch Team was compromised and would not be able to carry out their mission. The Diversion Team was directed to assume the mission and attempt to capture a driver.

The Diversion Team quickly devised a modified plan to do a POW snatch instead of a diversion ambush. Once I initiated the ambush, Hartwig and Blaaw would move to the cab of the truck and grab the driver. I would move to the near side of the truck and engage with my M-79 anyone or anything up or down the road reacting to the ambush. Todd, the RTO, would man the flank claymore on the right and the ARVN would man the left flank claymore. Once the Team had the POW, both flank claymores would be blown, and the team would move towards the predetermined extraction LZ.

The only problem is that the Team was set up on the uphill side of the road, away from the driver side of the vehicle. This would make it extremely difficult to assault the truck from the passenger side and still be quick enough to capture the driver. Additionally, the Team would have to cross the road to be able to move towards the extraction LZ – we were set up on the wrong side of the road. By now it was last light and too late to try and change locations, we had to go with what we had.

Shortly thereafter we started hearing signal shots along the road and almost immediately traffic started moving. We were not aware until the trucks started moving that there was likely a small stream up the road about 100-150 meters. We could hear each truck gear down, slowly cross the stream, and then begin an uphill grade towards our location. For this reason, the trucks were going relatively slow as they passed through our kill zone – definitely to our advantage. From our vantage point in the bomb crater, we could see exactly what was in the truck bed.

After several trucks had passed we recognized the interval between vehicles was about 5-10 minutes. At this point the discussions began; do we hit the next truck or not? It seemed like before we could decide another truck rounded the corner about 50 meters away and we had to determine if it was carrying troops or not. Sometimes the last truck had not cleared the area good before the next truck appeared. We were waiting on the lone truck, with an appreciable distance between the others. We certainly didn’t want to hit a truck loaded with troops, especially since our claymore were aimed at the tires! We also didn’t want to hit a truck if others were close by and start a fight with multiple trucks! The decision had to be made quickly once a truck was in site!

Because of the heavy traffic on the road that night we had to assume there were a lot of NVA security forces in the area as well. Also, we knew that Jaks team was only three to four hundred meters away from us and they had already been compromised by NVA activity. At this point the discussion became “is this too damn risky?” Since I was the “new guy” on the team (I had only been at CCC for 3 months), I just kept my mouth shut. Several more trucks rolled by, and the discussion continued – hit the next truck or not or get the hell out of here? By about 2230 hours, twenty-three trucks had passed, none carrying troops. Finally, 1SG Forest Earl Todd ended the discussions saying something I will never forget, “this is a risky fucking business, we’re gonna do what we came to do.” With that, the twenty-fourth truck rounded the corner and came into our vision. As the truck approached I could see there were no troops. I squeezed the clacker, and four claymores ripped the night. It was on!

The truck stopped directly in front of us. Obviously the ARVN didn’t understand the plan as immediately he fired the left flank claymore. He also must have placed a WP Grenade near his claymore as there was suddenly burning WP all over the place (I believe it was Hartwig who got WP burns from the grenade). Simultaneously, for a reason I will never understand, team members began firing their Car-15’s into the truck. THIS WASN’T THE PLAN! While they began changing magazines, I jumped out of the bomb crater and moved to my position on the near side of the road. I looked back to see everyone donning their protective masks as the ARVN’s claymore had blown CS powder all over the area. I was still clear of the CS so I ran to the far side of the truck to see if the driver was wounded, dead, or gone. The driver door was open and the cab was empty. For an instant I realized I was standing in the open road, with a damn HE round in the chamber, and somewhere behind me in the brush was a pissed off NVA who may or may not be wounded and may or may not be armed. Was he going to shoot me in the back as I searched the cab? I didn’t have time to think about it as the entire area turned daylight as burning WP ignited the truck’s ruptured fuel tank that had leaked out onto the road. The road and the rear of the truck went up in flames.

Almost simultaneously, another truck, loaded with a reaction force, rounded the corner about 50 meters away and began firing. I engaged with the M-79 and after firing several rounds of HE, I was now getting hit with the CS so I moved to the front of the truck and donned my protective mask. As the team started withdrawing I continued to pump rounds at the reaction force and surrounding area as I moved to the near side of the truck. The firefight continued for several minutes as I scrambled to the bomb crater and continued covering the team’s withdrawal with 40 mm HE rounds. After a while there was a lull in the firing. At this point I could hear the team moving up the hill behind me, so I began withdrawing in that direction. Shortly after I linked up with the rest of the team and we continued to move up the hill. The bad news is that the team was on the wrong side of the road, moving away from our extraction LZ. What else could go wrong?

We continued another 200 meters or so and stopped in a small depression near the crest of the hill. We set up our RON site and covered ourselves with poncho liners. Within minutes the NVA moved all along the road below us and began randomly firing up the hill. Fortunately for us, the vegetation was very dense, and we were in a depression, so their fire wasn’t effective. Covy arrived on station and asked us to mark our location. Right or wrong, the team leader decided we would not mark our location because at the time the NVA didn’t know exactly where we were. He figured if we marked our location the NVA would know exactly where we were and would assault our position. For that reason and the fact that by this time the road and truck had stopped burning and couldn’t be used to mark the enemy location, TAC Air was not called in. In less than an hour a truck arrived and pulled the ambushed truck off the road. Unbelievably, traffic started moving again later that night! The NVA continued to fire up the hill, trying to make us disclose our location. We remained quiet and alert for the remainder of the night.

Before first light we did a map check and selected a potential extraction LZ. Knowing the NVA would be online sweeping up the hill at daylight we were moving before first light. After moving a few hundred meters, we arrived at the LZ, established a perimeter, and called for extraction. The Cobras came in first and everything remained quiet. As the extraction aircraft approached it started taking fire from a nearby ridgeline. We engaged the NVA and simultaneously, the aircraft put its nose down and departed the area. As the team withdrew I continued to cover their withdrawal with my M-79. Covey then called in A1E’s to work the ridgeline with CBU-25’s (Cluster Bomb Units) as we continued withdrawing.

We were directed to another LZ, several hundred meters away. We moved as fast as possible with no further contact with the NVA. On arrival at the LZ we again established a perimeter and called for extraction. The cobras came in with no enemy activity but apparently some NVA had followed or tracked us to the new LZ. As the extraction bird approached, an RPD opened up. As I had a clear shot, I quickly hit the RPD location with HE rounds from my M-79. The gun went silent, and the chopper was able to land. As I boarded the chopper, we continued taking small arms fire from the same general location. From a kneeling position in the aircraft, I returned fire, as did the door gunner, while the remainder of the team scrambled aboard the aircraft. As we cleared the LZ the cobras and A1E’s began working the NVA positions. Relieved, we flew back to the launch site at Dak To. There we linked up with the other seven team members who had been extracted earlier that morning without incident. Later that day flew back to FOB-2 for debriefing, thankful to be alive.

Hard to believe it has been fifty-three years since Ashtray, but I remember it like it was yesterday. This lovely lady sitting next to me is my wife Lola. She is the mother of my three daughters and has been with me for 48 years, through thick and thin, and has been my constant companion in dealing with the demons that haunt so many of us, even today. For that I will forever be grateful. Bill