“Remember only
my name”

By Greg Walker (ret.) USA Special Forces

“Bottom line, failure by the entire chain of command [in both cases]. This isn’t the time for excuses but rather a time to reflect, review and look for solutions to prevent other possible suicides.”

Major General (ret) Kenneth R. Bowra USA Special Forces, 1/25/2025

Mantenuto’s passion and his devotion to taking care of his teammates and their families was borne of his own troubled family life while growing up and the positive impact of his hockey coaches, especially in the Division One ranks at college. He was a team player, but he was also the first one there to help a teammate out off the ice. He brought that cultivated compassion and determination to Special Forces upon his arrival at 1st Group.

Mantenuto only shared his presentation with one person, a civilian who was in the civilian support group he’d co-founded. She handled the administrative aspects of W.A.R. to include arranging to have the program’s wrist bands made. His concern with giving a copy to anyone else, particularly Madigan’s behavioral health clinic, was to protect what little time he had at home. However, others involved in its evolution included Maj. Ryan Shubat at the Special Operations Forces Embedded Behavioral Health Clinic at Fort Lewis.

On May 17, 2017, I was one of roughly 12 attendees at a closed meeting at Group Headquarters at JBLM. The purpose of the meeting was to review, informally, all that had led up to Mantenuto’s suicide. Other attendees included the group commander and command sergeant major, Dr. Bill McNulty from the SF medical clinic, Major Shubat, and the Group JAG officer. Along with me were two other civilians, including Mario Bolivar, director of the in-patient program in Oregon that Mantenuto had attended, and a now-former manager from the Wounded Warrior Project.

Over the course of the meeting, it was determined that no one at Group possessed the working PowerPoint Mantenuto used in his highly popular presentations. Indeed, no one present could really recall what the acronym “W.A.R.” stood for. What was determined was the program was essentially overseen by the Group command sergeant major who was a strong supporter of having an alternative within the compound’s confines for the enlisted and commissioned to attend. In a private conversation after the meeting, the CSM confided to me that he had not seen what was coming regarding his subordinate’s suicide and he was questioning how he’d missed the cues given. One of the reasons the CSM failed to notice anything was because he’d arranged with Mantenuto to only see him on Monday and Friday mornings to “check in”. Otherwise Mike was essentially unaccounted for.

And as with MSG Matthew Livelsberger who shot himself in Las Vegas on January 1, 2025, USSOCOM issued this statement regarding Mantenuto’s suicide. “He displayed no concerning behavior prior to…”.

However, both Mantenuto and Livelsberger did indeed display the classic behavioral health warning signs predicting suicide. These within the embedded behavioral health clinics they were being seen by and outside these by friends and family members.

Warning Signs

• Possession of firearm or other weapon
• Suicide threats or statements, gestures, or recent attempts
• Detailed recent threats of violence
• Severe rage for seemingly minor reasons
• Severe destruction of property
• Serious physical fighting with peers, family, or others
• Rehearsing an attack or ambush

W.A.R. – What is it good for?

What, then, was W.A.R.? We know the peer group continued after Mantenuto’s death at 1st Group and met once a week at the compound. It was no longer an officially-sponsored meeting by the Group commander and was closed to all but participating members. It was chaired by an active duty Special Forces senior non-commissioned officer who worked closely with Staff Sgt. Mantenuto on the original W.A.R. program of instruction. According to Sgt. 1st Class Chris Harper, PAO NCOIC at 1st Group then, when asked by me about ongoing suicide intervention and prevention at Group, I received this reply: “Our approach to suicide prevention is to promote healthy, productive behaviors through engaged, compassionate leadership.” Offline, SFC Harper went on to say Mantenuto’s loss was still deeply felt at Group and was a constant reminder for the operators to remain in touch with each other and be vigilant about their own perhaps undisclosed challenges.

In reviewing what few things were possible, to include a close examination of the police photos provided me of Mantenuto’s day pack and its contents, we know Mantenuto was seeking to change how Special Forces – and then the Army – conducted its mental health and substance programs. “Michael said they [the programs and approaches] were all outdated and ineffective,” said one source. “He had seen what worked so well while he was in-patient in Oregon and that opened up his eyes as to what more was possible.”

For example, Mantenuto wanted to see the AA 12-Step program re-written specifically for soldiers. This due to the Soldier’s unique environment (Special Forces) and challenges to include the effects of wartime trauma and substance use. He was quietly studying and experimenting with cutting-edge drugs in their early trials for PTSD, suicidal impulses, depression and anxiety. Mantenuto was able to do this as he was exempt from drug tests at his unit despite his 28-day inpatient stay in Oregon. These included two of the non-prescribed drugs found in his system at his autopsy. His website searches included The Influence, a 21st Century news and opinion site regarding substance use, addiction, rehabilitation, recovery, and new treatment models.

And he was readdressing the spiritual role in addiction and behavioral health treatment.

“Mike was all over it. He was respected for his stand regarding his own demons and he was known to be ‘on call’ whenever someone needed encouragement or help,” another source told me. “He never really pushed you. He’d come by or call or text and say, ‘Hey, what are you doing tonight? I’m going to a meeting. Wanna’ come along?’”

Undue and inappropriate Command influence

Sadly, on April 24, 2017, Mantenuto ran out of energy, passion, and steam. His own demons re-surfaced and in large part, due to Madigan Army Hospital’s behavioral health leadership not listening to the wiser voices beneath them to make sure Mike was first and foremost treated as a high-risk patient in his own recovery. “He should never have been placed in the position he was,” a senior SOF EBH therapist told me.

Roughly four months before Mike’s suicide I was visiting SUDCC-JBLM as part of my duties as military liaison for Cedar Hills Hospital. While meeting with the former director, Ms. Michelle Hooker, she asked if I would visit Ross Echterling then at the SOF EBH on JBLM.

Ross and I knew each other from past referrals made by the SOF EBH to Cedar Hills and its military program. He was described as becoming very concerned about the W.A.R. program and in particular, Mike as a BH/SUDCC patient who’d been seen by Echterling.

Ross wanted to approach the Group CDR about his concerns as he was Mike’s therapist. But, as a civilian and with no SOF military background, he felt he had little “throw weight” to do so.

His concerns raised at the EBH level had been deflected/ignored by his immediate superior, a “green suiter” at the EBH.

I met with Ross for about an hour. He shared his observations and concerns. He reaffirmed Mantenuto having a patient history of BH and SUDCC issues—which is why he was in-patient for 28 days—to include heroin addiction. Ross offered he was directed to help Mike with the W.A.R. program’s content to include professional clinical opinions/insights/information. This conflict of interest was nagging at him greatly but he had little support with in the Group’s leadership to include the Group Surgeon.

We discussed options. He asked me if I would go to the Group Commander. He knew I sometimes interfaced with commanders at all levels on cases—something we did at the SOCOM Care Coalition as a matter of course. I declined—offering Mike had been back from our program since 2015, and those at the SOF EBH to include Major Ryan Shubat, its OIC at the time and Mike’s mentor at W.A.R., knew of his problems.

I had no former affiliation with the Group Commander and it would have been inappropriate for me to act as the messenger for his EBH team or, for that matter, for the JBLM SUDCC director, Ms. Michelle Hooker, whose professional concerns were likewise being ignored by both Madigan Behavioral Health and 1st Group.

We then talked worst case scenario regarding Mike, the W.A.R. program, and those SF and SF support soldiers as well as others not known about that Mike was meeting with, presenting to, and offering non-clinical advice and counseling to. What would be the fallout if he (a) relapsed himself and (b) took his own life?

Catastrophic on many levels as we were to find out four months later, to include several Special Forces soldiers at JBLM, Fort Bragg, and on Okinawa whose reaction to Mike’s suicide re-triggered their own similar thoughts. No one knew Mantentuo’s W.A.R. network had reached well outside the gate at Fort Lewis. Swift intervention took place as Army behavioral health experts tracked down those they became aware of.

Michael Mantenuto and Matthew Livelsberger

What is Michael Mantenuto’s legacy then? His widow shared with me it is two-fold. The first were their children who Mantenuto loved and cared for above all else. The second was emphasized in our last communication on the subject.

“Doing good, taking care of those struggling, healing. Otherwise his death was in vain. We know the shame associated with those struggling with compulsions [and] addictions…Michael shared the message of AA. The idea that you’re not alone in the struggle and that we rise up for one another. That is where we get our strength, hope and courage from.”

As with MSG Livelsberger’s suicide the official statement from USSOCOM was that Mantenuto appeared fine—“no concerning behavior”—when in fact his Command and others at JBLM chose to turn a blind eye to the warning signs he’d displayed.

Tragically SSG Michael Mantenuto did not have to die. His death, his suicide, was enabled by Army leaders and clinicians, as well as civilian therapists, who either saw being associated with the former actor and diagnosed addict as somehow beneficial for their own agendas, or were simply cowered into professional submission at the uppermost Command levels.

According to USSOCOM no documents or information regarding MSG Livelsberger’s suicide will be released for at least 90 days from the publication of this article. With the caveat the timeframe may be longer. This due in part to the growing questions being asked of the Army and USSOCOM / USASOC about the specifics of Livelsberger’s acknowledged request to have entered the Command’s Preservation of the Force and Family program in Germany. A program he had been a part of for a year before requesting Christmas leave and returning to Fort Carson, Colorado, and the 10th Special Forces Group there.

The same drawn out process occurred with Mike Mantenuto’s case given the 15-6 investigation’s findings regarding the truth about what took Mike over the edge in 2017. In short, the accusing finger was found to be pointing back at his Command and JBLM/Madigan Army Medical Center and we may find the same holds true regarding MSG Livelsberger.

And for now here we are once again.

Trust but verify

Matthew Livelsberger was a professional soldier and one of the truly best “Green Beret” operators to have served and fought in our global war on terrorism. He was highly skilled, exceptionally well educated, a devoted husband and father, and decorated twice for valor under enemy fire.

This is what we must remember about him.

We must also remember and now demand the Army and USASOC/USSOCOM present in all transparency what this dedicated patriot was suffering from when he raised his hand for help and what his diagnosis’ were, to include any and all medications he may have been prescribed leading up to his suicide.

And if an autopsy is performed of his brain we may discover he was also suffering from CET—a trademark injury for all SF/SOF operators with multiple exposure to blast and other concussion causes.

And that those accountable for missing key warning signs both in Germany and at Fort Carson are appropriately addressed. This to include placing the SOF embedded behavioral health and SUDCC clinicians back under the direct command and control of “Big Army” on-base mental health professionals.

Matthew Livelsberger, 37, wrote that he needed to “cleanse” his mind “of the brothers I’ve lost and relieve myself of the burden of the lives I took.”

Michael Mantenuto, 35, left his final thoughts and a request of us all.

“I’ve been running from one question
“What’s the difference between suicide and taking one’s own life?
“One is based in Fear, and the other is based in Love
“I wasn’t afraid
“Remember only my name
“There is only Love”

We can ill afford to leave these fallen comrades of ours behind. We must remember and honor their names. We must do better.

https://www.specialforces78.com/transforming-the-terrible-secret-of-suicide/

Editors Note: I would encourage you to take the time to read Greg Walker’s “Losing the Last Greatest Battle—Why Military and Veteran Suicide Isn’t Going Away.” This excellent article digs into the circumstances and details of the deaths of several Green Berets, including Matt Livelsberger, and the huge obstacles that will need to be overcome if really significant progress is to be made.